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European Union Referendum 2 
Abstract 
We used an identities approach to examine voting intentions in the June 2016 United 
Kingdom (UK) referendum on membership of the European Union (EU). In April 2016, 303 
British adults (58.7% women, age M = 34.73) indicated their voting intentions for the 
referendum and completed measures of identification with the national in-group, perceived 
threat from Muslim immigrants, belief in Islamophobic conspiracy narratives, Islamophobia, 
general conspiracist beliefs, ambiguity tolerance, and belief in a clash of civilisations. Path 
and mediation analyses indicated that greater belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories 
mediated the link between Islamophobia and intention to vote to leave. Islamophobia and 
Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs also mediated the effects of perceived threat from Muslims 
on voting intentions. Other variables acted as antecedents of perceived threat or Islamophobic 
conspiracy narratives. These findings highlight the role that identity-based cognitions may 
have played in shaping voting intentions for the UK EU referendum.  
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To Brexit or Not to Brexit: The Roles of Islamophobia, Conspiracist Beliefs, and Integrated 
Threat in Voting Intentions for the United Kingdom European Union Membership 
Referendum 
 Writing shortly after the first United Kingdom (UK) referendum on membership of 
the then-European Community, held on the 5th of June 1975, Butler and Kitzinger (1976) 
warned against interpreting the vote to remain as an outburst of widespread public support for 
the broader European project. Support for membership “did not run deep”, they wrote, and it 
did not “result in a girding of the loins for a great new European adventure” (Butler & 
Kitzinger, 1976, pp. 279-280). The lack of British public enthusiasm for European integration 
would remain an important feature of the UK’s membership of the European Union (Baker & 
Schnapper, 2015; Gifford, 2014), culminating forty-one years later when, on the 23rd of June 
2016, the British electorate voted by 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the EU. This invites the 
question of what drove the country to vote for “Brexit” (a portmonteau of Britain and exit) 
and more broadly what motivates Euroscepticism in the UK.  
 Academic research of Eurosceptic attitudes across Europe has broadly identified three 
core explanations, each identifying a set of (non-mutually exclusive concerns) as being the 
primary motive (see de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Gabel, 1998; Lubbers, 2008). First, 
the political approach suggests that, given the low level of information about and knowledge 
of the integration process, voters resort to proxies when formulating their views about 
integration. These proxies tend to be strongly influenced by domestic politics, particularly 
government approval and support for incumbent political parties (Anderson, 1998; Franklin, 
Marsh, & Wlezien, 1994; Franklin, van der Eijk, & Marsh, 1995; Marsh, 1998; van der Eijk 
& Franklin, 1996). Preliminary analysis of the Brexit vote suggests that some voters may 
have used the UK EU referendum as an opportunity to voice their discontent with the 
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incumbent party of government and politicians of the main political parties in general 
(Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Jessop, 2017).  
 On the other hand, a utilitarian approach suggests that voters will be influenced by a 
calculation of economics costs and benefits of EU membership. These studies explain support 
for European integration primarily in terms of income, education, and occupational skills, and 
suggest that support for integration will be lower in social groups who are (or feel) more 
exposed to competition as a result of the single market and free movement of labour (e.g., 
Anderson, 1998; Anderson & Reichert, 1996; Gable & Palmer, 1995; Hakhverdian, van 
Elsas, van der Brug, & Kuhn, 2013; Ritzen, Wehner, & Zimmerman, 2016; van Klingeren, 
Boomgaaden, & de Vreese, 2013). Much of the early analysis and commentary of the Brexit 
vote has utilised this utilitarian perspective, suggesting that Brexit voters were more likely to 
be those “left behind” (Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2017; Los, 
McCann, Springford, Thissen, 2017; see also Menon & Salter, 2016) – the financially 
insecure, who have few or no educational qualifications and little social mobility.   
 Finally, the identity approach suggests that attitudes toward European integration will 
be driven by feelings of national attachment and perceptions of threat to the nation-state and 
national integrity (Kritzinger, 2003). Although this literature has focused on perceived threats 
to national interests (e.g., Christin & Treschel, 2002), some scholars have suggested that 
Euroscepticism is more strongly driven by perceived cultural threat (McLaren, 2002, 2006). 
In this view, the notion of European integration and the enlargement of the EU, which 
implies the integration of different peoples and cultures, poses a threat to in-group cultural 
values (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Lubbers & Jaspers, 2010; van Klingeren et al., 2013). 
Threats may come from any non-national change in society (e.g., globalisation; Farrell & 
Newman, 2017), but much of the literature on European integration has focused on the threat 
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posed by immigration (e.g., de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 
2013).  
 This focus on immigration is not misplaced: social integration theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986) proposes that individuals tend to achieve positive social identity through social 
comparisons between one’s in-group and relevant out-groups. If the comparison results in a 
negative evaluation of the in-group, individuals may seek to re-establish positive social 
identity through derogatory views of the out-group, particularly if the out-group is perceived 
as a threat (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan et al., 
2002). Studies of European integration consistently show that, when immigrants are 
perceived as an out-group and a threat to in-group cultural values, respondents are more 
likely to reject further European integration and provide greater electoral support for 
Eurosceptic political parties (e.g., Curtice, 2016; de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Ford & 
Goodwin, 2014; Lubbers & Jaspers, 2010). Moreover, anti-immigrant and anti-
multiculturalist sentiments have been widely implicated in the Brexit vote (Goodwin & 
Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016). 
 One particular feature of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe concerns the perceived 
threat posed by Muslims and Islam to Western cultural values (e.g., Azrout, van Spanje, & de 
Vreese, 2013; Schiffer & Wagner, 2011; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Although such 
sentiments are partly driven by external events such as terrorist attacks and the refugee crisis, 
scholars have also highlighted the impact of Islamophobic conspiracist narratives vis-à-vis 
European integration (Fekete, 2011; Ünal, 2016). These narratives draw on older forms of 
racism and Islamophobia, but also incorporate concepts derived from the notion of a clash of 
civilisations (i.e., that there is an inter-civilisational conflict caused and maintained by 
cultural differences) to suggest that there is an ongoing attempt to Islamise Europe (Fekete, 
2011). The discursive framework of this conspiracist narrative seems to be based on the 
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claims that Europe is being Islamised, either directly via intentional asymmetrical population 
growth or mass migration, or indirectly via naïve attempts to encourage multi-culturalism.  
 To date, very little research has examined antecedents of this conspiracist narrative 
and, more importantly, its impact on attitudes toward European integration. In a study with 
German respondents (N = 355), Ünal (2016) reported that perceived out-group threat was 
positively associated with stronger belief in the Islamophobic conspiracy theory. In addition, 
out-group threat also fully mediated the relationships between in-group identification, 
stronger belief in the clash of civilisations hypothesis, and ambiguity tolerance on the one 
hand, and belief in the Islamophobic conspiracy theory on the other. In Ünal’s (2016) view, 
the Islamophobic conspiracy theory may typify a minority conspiracy theory (i.e., where a 
minority group is considered a collective conspirator that threatens the majority group; 
Campion-Vincent, 2005; Moscovici, 1987) driven by perceived threat and related 
antecedents.  
The Present Study 
 Here, we sought to extend the work of Ünal (2016) to examine the extent to which 
perceived out-group threat and belief in Islamophobic conspiracist narratives influenced 
voting intentions in the UK EU membership referendum that took place in June 2016. This 
focus is not misplaced given that polling data in the run-up to the referendum indicated that 
attitudes toward immigration was a decisive factor in voting intentions and that immigration 
was the factor most focused on by those seeking Brexit (e.g., Nardelli, 2016). More 
specifically, advocates for Brexit focused on the inability of the UK political system to stem 
the flow of immigrants from other EU countries, with an attendant and not unrelated focus on 
the supremacy of EU laws over British laws (for a review and analysis, see Arnorsson & 
Zoega, 2016). In contrast, those favouring remaining in the EU generally focused on 
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uncertainty about future trading agreements, which would have knock-on effects on 
investment, employment, and trade.  
 In the present work, we draw on the identity approach to European integration, which 
suggests that intention to vote for Brexit vote can, in part at least, be explained as a function 
of perceptions of threat posed by immigration and EU freedom of movement (Alfano, 
Dustmann, & Frattini, 2016; Hobolt, 2016). Preliminary evidence suggests that discourse of 
immigration in the UK in the run-up to the UK EU referendum was largely one of 
uncertainty, anxiety, and xenophobia, emerging from othering distinctions (i.e., drawing 
marked distinctions between the self and immigrants); this was true of political discourse 
(e.g., speeches by politicians), as well as public discourse as reflected in newspaper editorials 
and commentaries (Cap, 2017). Thus, we expected that that greater perceptions of out-group 
threat would be associated with greater intention to vote to leave the EU. Furthermore, like 
Ünal (2016), we believed that perceptions of threat would be associated antecedenally with a 
number of individual difference variables on the one hand and that its relationship with 
voting intentions would be mediated by belief in conspiracy theories. Below, we briefly 
introduce the variables included in our analyses and our hypotheses. 
 Integrated threat. According to the intergroup threat theory (Stephan, Ybarra, & 
Rios Morrison, 2015), individuals will be more likely to exhibit prejudice toward social out-
groups to the extent that those out-groups are perceived as realistic and symbolic threats. The 
former refers to threats to a group’s political or economic power, resources, and general well-
being, whereas symbolic threats refer to threats to a group’s values, belief systems, morality, 
philosophy of life, or identity (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Studies 
have consistently shown that intergroup threat plays an important role in negative perceptions 
and interactions between a host country’s majority group and immigrants (for a review, see 
Riek et al., 2006). In the context of the UK EU referendum, we expected that greater 
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perceived symbolic and realistic threats from Muslim immigrants would be associated with 
greater intention to vote to leave the EU. 
 Conspiracist ideation. In addition to the associations between perceived threat and 
voting intention, we also examined the extent to which belief in the Islamophobic conspiracy 
theory mediated these relationships. Insofar as this conspiracist narrative represents a means 
of demonising the minority out-group (i.e., Muslim immigrants; Ünal, 2016), we expected 
that stronger belief in the conspiracy theory would be associated with greater intention to vote 
to leave the EU. In broad outline, previous work supports this reasoning: for example, one 
study found that belief in Jewish conspiracy theories was associated with anti-Semitic 
behavioural intentions and actual behaviour (operationalised in terms of monetary donations) 
in Polish respondents (Bilewicz, Winieski, Kofta, & Wójcik, 2013; see also Swami, 2012).  
In the present study, we also expected that belief in the Islamophobic conspiracy 
theory would mediate the relationship between perceived threat and voting intention. That is, 
given the perceived threat negatively impacts perceptions of immigrants (Riek et al., 2006), 
we hypothesised that individuals who perceive greater threat would be more likely to endorse 
conspiracist beliefs that demonise out-groups (i.e., Muslim immigrants), which in turn would 
impact on voting intentions. Finally, in addition to examining belief in the Islamophobic 
conspiracy theory, we included a measure of generic conspiracist beliefs. This was based on 
the consistent finding from the psychological literature that belief in conspiracy theories are 
monological (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Swami et 
al., 2011; Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012); that is, individuals who are more prone to believe 
in conspiracist narratives were expected to more strongly endorse the Islamophobic 
conspiracy theory.  
 Antecedents of threat. According to Stephan et al. (2009), perceptions of intergroup 
threat arise within particular social contexts, but also vary in relation to individual difference 
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variables (see also Bakker & de Vreese, 2016; Nielsen, 2016). One such variable, derived 
from social identity theory, is the extent to which individuals identify with their in-group. The 
more that individuals identify with their in-group, the more they are likely to be concerned 
with its interests and react negatively to perceived threats from out-groups (Riek et al., 2006). 
That is, a sense of collective identity and identification with an in-group is more likely to 
emerge when individuals believe that self-categorisation at the group level is a meaningful 
way of understanding social phenomena (Haslam, 2001). Critical here is the degree of 
comparative “fit”, or extent to which differences between members of the in-group are seen 
as small compared to the differences between that category and other categories in a social 
context (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Thus, previous 
studies with respondents from multiple European countries have reported that greater 
identification with the in-group is associated with greater perceived threat from Muslim 
immigrants (e.g., Gonzáles, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Ünal, 2016). Based on this 
work, we included identification with the national in-group as an exogenous variable in our 
analyses, but also expected that it would directly predict intention to vote to leave the EU.  
 Given the focus on the Islamophobic conspiracist narrative, we also included a 
measure of Islamophobia. Whereas the conspiracist narrative is more specifically focused on 
claims about the Islamisation of Europe, Islamophobia more broadly can be viewed as a 
neologism for racist attitudes and beliefs, prejudice, and discrimination aimed at Muslims 
(Lee, Gibbons, Thompson, & Timani, 2009). At the same time, some scholars have suggested 
that the target of Islamophobia is not religious faith but rather a people (Halliday, 1999); 
indeed, Salaita (2006) suggests that Islamophobia is synonymous with anti-Arab racism. In 
this view, Islamophobia can be considered to be a conceptually different construct to 
Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs; although the two are likely to be correlated, they may also 
have independent effects vis-à-vis attitudes toward European integration.   
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 Likewise, we also included a measure of belief in the clash of civilisations narratives. 
This variable has been previously found to be associated with intergroup bias (e.g., Sidanius, 
Kteily, Levin, Pratto, & Obaidi, 2016), as well as the Islamophobic conspiracist narrative 
(Ünal, 2016). Following Ünal (2016), we also included a measure ambiguity tolerance, which 
refers to a tendency to view ambiguous situations (i.e., those that are complex, ambivalent, or 
new) as sources of threat (Budner, 1962; Furnham & Marks, 2013). Ünal (2016) 
hypothesised, and found support for, the idea that greater integration of Muslims in Europe 
would be perceived as ambiguous, as it challenged traditional in-group narratives about the 
nation-state, which in turn would be associated with greater perceived threat.   
 Finally, we also included a measure of political knowledge about the EU. Although 
this aspect was more exploratory, it is grounded in the notion that greater political knowledge 
and awareness of the functions and processes of the EU would require a degree of critical 
thinking. Although it is possible that such a thinking style would promote a more rationale 
appraisal of (the low level of) realistic and symbolic threats, it seems more likely that it 
would have an independent and direct effect on voting intentions. Previous work provides 
some preliminary support for this perspective, finding for example that greater education is 
predictive of greater support for European integration (Gabel, 1998). On the other hand, de 
Vrees and Baumgaarden (2006) found that greater political sophistication, which includes a 
measure of political knowledge of the EU, was associated with lower support for EU 
integration in Denmark.  
 Summary. Our dependent variable in the present work was voting intention in the 
UK EU membership referendum, with our data collection taking place before the actual 
referendum in June 2016. While we acknowledge that voting intentions may not necessarily 
translate into actual voting behaviour, we emphasise that we are focusing on underlying 
explanations of attitudes toward the EU referendum. Moreover, voting intention is widely-
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used as a dependent measure in the referendum literature (e.g., de Vrees & Baumgaarden, 
2006). In summary, we predicted that belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories would 
mediate the relationship between perceived threat and an intention to leave the EU. We 
further expected that generic conspiracist ideation would be positively associated with belief 
in the Islamophobic conspriacy narrative and that identification with the national in-group, 
belief in a clash-of-civilisations narrative, ambiguity tolerance, Islamophobia, and political 
knowledge of the EU would be significantly associated with perceived threat. A hypothesised 
model of these relationships is presented in Figure 1.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 The study was approved by the relevant departmental ethics committee (application 
number: VRE1516-1352). All data were collected via the Prolific Academic website, a 
crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that allows individuals to complete academic surveys for 
monetary compensation. A brief description of the study, including estimated duration and 
compensation, was posted on the website on April 14-15, 2016. Because of our research aims 
and the country-specificity of questionnaire items, participation was limited to respondents 
from the UK. After providing informed consent, participants were directed to the measures 
described below, which were presented in an anonymous form and in random order via the 
randomisation function with Qualtrics, which hosted the survey. In exchange for completing 
the survey, participants were paid £1.00. All participants received debriefing information at 
the end of the survey. 
 The initial participant pool consisted of 321 respondents. However, because of the 
very small number of participants who indicated that they did not intend to vote in the EU 
membership referendum (n = 18), we elected to omit data from these participants. The final 
sample, therefore, consisted of 303 respondents who indicated that they intended to vote in 
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the EU membership referendum (58.7% women, 40.6% men, 0.7% other). Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 74 years (M = 34.73, SD = 12.60) and the majority were of British 
White descent (92.4%). In terms of educational qualifications, 23.8% had completed 
minimum secondary schooling, 47.2% had an undergraduate degree, 17.8% had a 
postgraduate degree, 7.3% were still in full-time education, and 4.0% had some other 
qualification. Finally, the majority of the sample self-reported as being atheists or of no 
religious affiliation (52.5%), 34.3% as Christians, 7.6% as agnostics, and the remainder as of 
some other religious background.  
Measures 
 Referendum voting intentions. Participants were informed that the EU membership 
referendum was scheduled to take place in the UK and Gibraltar on June 23, 2016. They were 
then asked to indicate whether they intended to vote in the referendum (1 = Yes, 2 = Have not 
decided/Not sure, 3 = No). All participants were also asked the question that appeared on 
ballot papers (“Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave 
the European Union?”), but we modified the response format to include an uncertain option 
(1 = Remain a member of the European Union, 2 = Have not decided/Not sure, 3 = Leave the 
European Union).  
 Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs. Because Ünal (2016) did not fully report on the 
design and factorial validity of his measure of Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs, we elected 
to design a novel scale based on best-practice recommendations (Spector, 1992). Specifically, 
the first author initially defined and refined the construct of interest through a careful reading 
of the available academic and non-academic literature. The first author then developed an 
initial item pool, which was then refined through discussion with all other authors. The final 
item pool consisted of 13 items (see Table 1), which participants were asked to rate for 
agreement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). The 
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factorial validity and internal consistency of this measure is evaluated in the Results section 
below.  
 Clash-of-civilisations intergroup conflict. We included the Clash-of-Civilisations 
Attributions Scale (Sidanius, Henry, Pratto, & Levin, 2004; adaptation: Ünal, 2016) to 
measure the essentialist belief that there is an ongoing clash of civilisations between the West 
and the Islamic world. This is a 4-item scale that captures endorsement of the existence of 
such a clash of civilisations (sample item: “We are currently facing a ‘clash of 
civilisations’”), with items rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strong disagree, 5 = 
Strongly agree). An overall score was computed as the mean of all 4 items, with higher 
scores reflecting greater endorsement of the belief in a clash of civilisations. Ünal (2016) 
reported that scores on the adaptation of this scale had good validity estimates and adequate 
internal consistency. In the present study, Cronbach’s α for this scale was .87.  
 Identification with national in-group. Participants’ identification with a British in-
group was measured using 3 items from the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & 
Crocker, 1992), a method that has been used previously (Ünal, 2016; Verkuyten, 2005). The 
items measure participants’ beliefs about the extent to which their identity is shaped by, and 
their pride in, being British (sample item: “I am proud to be British”). All items were rated on 
a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) and an overall score 
was computed as the mean of all 3 items, such that higher scores reflect greater identification 
with the British in-group. Previous studies have reported that scores on this measure have 
good validity and reliability estimates (e.g., Ünal, 2016; Verkuyten, 2005). Here, Cronbach’s 
α for this measure was .92. 
 Political knowledge. To assess political knowledge of the EU, we adapted an earlier 
measure used by de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) in a survey on European integration in 
Dutch and Danish adult populations. In its original formulation, this measure included 5 
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open-ended questions about the number of Commissioners in the EU Commission, the name 
of the current President of European Commission, the name of the Danish/Dutch 
Commissioner, the country that currently holds the Presidency of the EU, and the number of 
countries currently seeking membership of the EU. We modified the third of these items so as 
to ask participants the name of the only UK Commissioner in the EU Commission. We used 
the same scoring method as de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005); that is, each item was coded 
as 1 for correct answers (respectively, correct at the time of participant recruitment: 28; Jean-
Claude Juncker; Jonathan Hill; Netherlands; 5) and 0 for missing or incorrect answers. For 
responses that required text, we were liberal in our scoring and allowed for spelling errors 
(e.g., “Yuncker” instead of “Juncker”) and alternate forms (e.g., “Lord Hill” instead of 
“Jonathan Hill”). A total score was computed as the sum of responses to all 5 items (scores 
could range from 0 to 5), with higher scores reflecting greater political knowledge of the EU. 
Cronbach’s α for this scale was .72.  
 Ambiguity intolerance. To measure intolerance of ambiguity, we used the Tolerance 
for Ambiguity Scale (TAS), an adaptation (Herman, Stevens, Bird, Mendenhall, Oddou, 
2010) of an earlier and widely-used scale designed by Budner (1962). Because the original 
measure suffers from poor reliability (e.g., Furnham, 1994), Herman et al. (2010) omitted 
items with low item-total correlations and added several new items. The adapted measure 
consists of 12 items that tap a preference for valuing diverse others, coping with change, 
dealing with unfamiliar situations, and managing conflicting perspectives (sample item: “The 
sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better”). All items were rated on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree), and an overall score was 
computed as the mean of all items. Herman et al. (2010) reported that overall scores on the 
TAS had adequate factorial validity and internal consistency. In the present study, 
Cronbach’s α for the TAS was .71.  
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General conspiracist beliefs. To measure individual differences in generic 
conspiracist ideation, participants were asked to complete the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs 
Scale (GCBS; Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). This is a 15-item scale that measures 
belief in five types of conspiracy theories, namely government malfeasance, extraterrestrial 
cover-up, malevolent global conspiracies, personal well-being conspiracies, and control of 
information conspiracies. All items were rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (Definitely 
not true) to 5 (Definitely true). Although the GCBS nominally consists of 5 factors, 
Brotherton et al. (2013) reported that the subscales are highly inter-correlated and suggested 
that total scores, which had adequate factorial fit, is more suitable in practical terms. 
Recently, however, Swami et al. (2017) reported that both the five-factor and one-factor 
model of GCBS scores had poor factorial fit and recommended that scholars using this scale 
should re-examine its factor structure prior to use. In the present dataset, the one-factor model 
with all items had poor fit, χ² M(90) = 811.109, χ² normed = 9.012, CFI = .772, RMSEA = .163 
(low = .153, high = .173), SRMR = .081, as did the five-factor model, χ² M(80) = 728.624, χ² 
normed = 9.108, CFI = .795, RMSEA = .164 (low = .153, high = .175), SRMR = .080. Swami et 
al. (2017) also proposed two-factor model, consisting of General Conspiracist Beliefs (6 
items) and Extraterrestrial Conspiracist Beliefs (4 items). In the present dataset, this model 
also had poor fit, χ² M(34) = 196.957, χ² normed = 5.793, CFI = .909, RMSEA = .126 (low = 
.109, high = .143), SRMR = .068. After consultation of modification indices, the metrics for 
the two-factor model had acceptable fit, χ² M(31) = 96.453, χ² normed = 3.111, CFI = .964, 
RMSEA = .084 (low = .065, high = .103), SRMR = .081. This led to the following 
covariances: items 13 and 14, items 13 and 15, and items 14 and 15. We, therefore, used the 
6-item General Conspiracist Beliefs factor (sample item: “New and advanced technology 
which would harm current industry is being suppressed”), which had adequate internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .87), in our analyses.  
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Islamophobia. To measure Islamophobia, we used the 8-item Cognitive subscale of 
the Islamophobia Scale (Lee et al., 2009). This subscale measures the belief that Islam is a 
harmful religion (sample item: “Islam is an evil religion”). We adapted items on the subscale 
to refer to the UK, rather than to the United States. All items were rated on a 5-point scale, 
ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). A subscale score was computed as 
the mean of items, so that higher scores reflect greater cognitive Islamophobia. Lee et al. 
(2009) reported that scores on the Islamophobia Scale yielded acceptable psychometric 
properties of reliability and validity. In the present study, Cronbach’s α was .97 for the 
subscale. 
Perceived symbolic and realistic threats. To measure perceived symbolic (i.e., to 
the values, norms, moral, and identities of the in-group) and realistic threat (i.e., to the 
political and economic power of the in-group), we used items that were first developed by 
Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman (1999) in their study of attitudes toward Asian migrants. We 
adapted the items so that they referred to Muslim immigrants and threats to the UK. The 
symbolic threat measure consisted of 7 items (sample item: “Muslims wants to take over the 
world”) and the realistic threat measure consisted of 8 items (sample item: “I would become 
incredibly uncomfortable speaking to a Muslim”), all of which were rated on a 10-point scale 
ranging from 1 (Strong disagree) to 10 (Strongly agree). Subscale scores were computed as 
the mean of items associated with each factor, so that higher scores reflect greater perceived 
threat from Muslim immigration to the UK. Previous studies have reported that these 
subscales have adequate psychometric properties in diverse samples (e.g., Stephan et al., 
1999). In the present study, Cronbach’s α was .88 for symbolic threat and .87 for realistic 
threat.  
Demographics. Participants were asked to provide their demographic details, 
consisting of sex, age, highest educational qualifications, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. 
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Results 
Factor Analysis of the Islamophobic Conspiracy Measure 
 To examine the factor structure of our novel measure of Islamophobic conspiracist 
beliefs, we used principal-axis EFA. This method allowed us to test for the best-fitting model 
for our dataset without a priori limitations in terms of modelling. Our sample size met 
conservative participant-to-item requirements for EFA (Nunnally, 1978). Items were 
submitted to EFA based on item distribution (standardized kurtosis values > 10.0 suggest a 
problem), average correlation with the other items (items with r < .40 should be dropped), 
and item-total correlation (items should be dropped with corrected-item total correlations are 
< .30), as recommended by Clark and Watson (1995). A quartimax rotation was used, as we 
expected a single, orthogonal factor (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1990). The number of factors to 
be extracted was determined by factor eigenvalues (λ) above 1.0 (the EGV1 criterion) and 
examination of the scree plot. Factor loadings were interpreted were interpreted using 
Tabachnik and Fidell’s (2007) recommendations (i.e., > .71 = excellent, > .63 = very good, > 
.55 = good, > .45 = fair, and > .32 = poor). As a measure of internal consistency, we 
computed Cronbach’s α, with values of .70 and greater considered acceptable (Kline, 1999).  
Examination of the 13 items submitted items for skewness, kurtosis, average 
correlations with other items, and item-total correlations suggested no underlying problems 
and that all items could be submitted to EFA. Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(78) = 5252.01, p 
< .001, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy, KMO = .96, 
showed that the 13 items had adequate common variance for factor analysis. The results of 
the EFA revealed a single factor with λ > 1.0 (i.e., λ = 10.29) and the scree plot suggested a 
primary factor with a steep cut-off to the second factor. Based on these findings, we elected 
to retain a single factor, which explained 79.1% of the common variance. Factor loadings are 
reported in Table 1 and, as can be seen, all items had excellent loadings. Finally, we 
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computed an overall Islamophobic conspiracist belief score by computing the mean of all 13 
items. This total score had very good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .97).  
Sex Differences and Inter-Scale Correlations 
 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics (M and SD) for all variables included in the 
present study. We first examined whether there were sex differences on any of our variables 
using a series of independent-samples t-tests. Because of the large number of comparisons 
(k), a Bonferroni adjustment was applied to reduce the chance of Type I error, such that p = 
(1 – α)k ≈ 1 – kα = α/k = .005 (Bland & Altman, 1995). As can be seen in Table 2, none of the 
comparisons reached significance and all effect sizes were negligible-to-small. In terms of 
voting intentions, our data suggested that 55.1% intended to vote to remain part of the EU, 
22.8% had not decided or were unsure about their voting intentions, and 22.1% intended to 
vote to leave the EU. A chi-squared test indicated no significant distribution pattern in voting 
direction in the EU membership referendum as a function of participant sex, χ2(4) = 7.53, p = 
.110. For these reasons, we pooled all data across participant sex for all subsequent analyses. 
Table 2 also reports on bivariate correlations between all variables included in the present 
study. As can be seen there were significant correlations between most variables in the 
expected directions, with the exception of political knowledge of the EU1. Most significant 
correlations were moderate-to-strong in strength. Because high inter-correlations can be 
indicative of multicollinearity, we examined variance inflation factors (VIFs). All VIFs were 
≤ 3.93, suggesting that multicollinearity was not a limiting issue in this dataset (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995).  
Path Analysis 
 Path analysis using Analysis of Moments Structure v.23 with maximum likelihood 
estimation using the covariance matrix (Arbuckle, 2014) was used to develop a conceptual 
integration of the predictors of intention to vote to leave the EU in the membership 
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referendum. Standard goodness-of-fit indices were selected a priori to assess the 
measurement models (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The normed model chi-square (χ²normed) is 
reported with lower values of the overall model χ² indicating goodness-of-fit. A χ²normed value 
of < 3.00 indicates good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The Steiger-Lind root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) and its 90% confidence interval provide a correction for model 
complexity (Hu & Bentler, 1999). RMSEA values close to .06 indicate a good fit, with values 
ranging to .10 representing a mediocre fit (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). The 
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) assesses the mean absolute correlation 
residual and is a badness-of-fit index: the smaller the SRMR, the better the model fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). A cut-off value for SRMR is recommended to be close to or < .09. The 
comparative fit index (CFI) measures the proportionate improvement in fit by comparing a 
target model with a more restricted, nested baseline model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The CFI 
reflects a goodness-of-fit index and is recommended to close to or > .95 for adequate fit. 
Our initial model was based on the hypothesised model developed by Ünal (2016), 
such that clash-of-civilisations attributions, identification with the national in-group, and 
ambiguity tolerance were included as exogenous variables; symbolic and realistic threats 
were included as mediators, and; Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs was included as an 
endogenous variable. However, we modified this model to include our additional variables: 
Islamophobia was entered as a less distal mediator, and Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs 
became a less distal mediator. General conspiracist beliefs was included as a less distal 
mediator. Because of the lack of significantly correlations between political knowledge and 
all other included variables, the former was included as a standalone predictor of the intention 
to vote to leave the EU (see Figure 1 for the hypothesised model). Voting intention was 
included as the endogenous variable. Because our primary research question was focused on 
intention to vote to leave the EU, we coded this item for analyses so that 1 = Remain/Have 
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not decided/Not sure and 2 = Leave the EU (i.e., this method distinguishes between intending 
to vote for Brexit and all other voting options). However, we also checked that our final 
model was robust by examining model fit when participants who were undecided or unsure 
about their voting intentions (n = 69) were excluded from the analyses (i.e., voting intentions 
were coded so that 1 = Remain and 2 = Leave the EU); these results are report in Footnote 2.  
The hypothesised model had acceptable fit with the exception of RMSEA values: 
χ2(19) = 78.782, p < .001; χ²normed = 4.146; CFI = .965; SRMR = .100; RMSEA = .102 with 
90% CI = .079-.126. Inspection of maximum likelihood scalar estimates indicated that there 
were several non-significant paths, which we deleted from the hypothesised model. These 
included pathways leading to intention to leave: symbolic threat (estimate = -0.005, SE = 
.017, CR = -0.283, p = .777), identification with national group (estimate = 0.006, SE = .021, 
CR = 0.295, p = .768), political knowledge (estimate = 0.019, SE = .018, CR = 1.102, p = 
.270), and general conspiracist beliefs (estimate = 0.024, SE = .020, CR = 1.216, p = .224). In 
addition, there was also a non-significant pathway between realistic threat and belief in 
Islamophobic conspiracist theories (estimate = -0.087, SE = .061, CR = -1.419, p = .156). The 
final model is depicted in Figure 2 and had acceptable fit, χ2(14) = 50.059, p < .001; χ²normed = 
3.576; CFI = .979; SRMR = .049; RMSEA = .092 with 90% CI = .066-.121.2  
Bootstrapping procedures were used to obtain the direct and indirect effects within the 
fitted model for two-variable pathways to intention to vote leave, drawing on 5,000 bootstrap 
samples from the dataset (see Table 3). Our results showed that there were significant direct 
and indirect effects from all two pathways within our fitted model. As there were direct 
pathways and from Islamophobia to intention to vote leave, and also via Islamophobic 
conspiracist beliefs, it was possible to test for Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs as a mediator 
in this pathway (see Figure 3). There was a significant indirect effect from this pathway, and 
considering the non-significant direct pathway from Islamophobia (cognitive) to intention to 
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vote leave, Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs was considered to fully mediate this model. 
Further, it was also possible to investigate realistic threat to intention to vote leave, via 
Islamophobia. However, there was no direct effect from via Islamophobia (cognitive) to 
intention to vote leave, and no indirect effect via Islamophobia (cognitive), therefore, there 
was no mediation within the pathway (see Figure 4). 
Discussion 
Our aim in the present study was to explore reasons for the Brexit voting intentions 
based on identities approach toward Euroscepticism, which broadly suggests that attitudes 
toward European integration is – in part at least – driven by feelings of national attachment 
and perceived threat to the nation-state (Kritzinger, 2003). In broad outline, our findings are 
consistent with this identities perspective, suggesting that the intention to vote to leave in the 
UK EU referendum in our sample of respondents was influenced by perceptions of symbolic 
(i.e., to the value, norms, morals, and identities of the in-group) and realistic threat (i.e., to the 
political and economic power of the in-group). However, our results also suggest some 
nuance in this perspective, with belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories and Islamophobia 
both playing mediatory roles. In addition, various antecedenal factors contributed to 
perceptions of threat. Below, we elaborate on these findings.  
Building on the notion that Euroscepticism is driven by perceived threat to in-group 
cultural values (McLaren, 2002, 2006; Riek et al., 2006), a number of commentators have 
highlighted the impact that attitudes vis-à-vis immigration may have had on the Brexit vote 
(Alfano et al., 2016; Hobolt, 2016). Our results are consistent with these suggestions: most 
importantly perhaps, we found that perceptions of threat to political and economic power 
posed by Muslim immigrants was directly associated with the intention to vote to leave the 
EU. However, contrary to our hypotheses, we found that perceived symbolic threat was not 
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directly associated with intention to vote to leave; rather, symbolic threat was indirectly 
associated with the intention to vote to leave via Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs.  
In broad outline, these findings are consistent with research conducted in other EU 
nations, which suggests that, when immigrants are perceived as an out-group and a threat to 
the in-group, respondents are more likely to reject European integration (Curtice, 2016; de 
Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Lubbers & Jaspers, 2010); however, 
our results extend previous work by suggesting that perceived threats realitistic posed by 
Muslim immigrants specifically may have shaped the intention to vote to leave the EU. This 
may hint at the conclusion drawn from a utilitarian perspective, namely that the Brexit vote 
was motivated by social and economic insecurity (Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Halikiopoulou & 
Vlandas, 2017; Los et al., 2017). On the other hand, it seems that symbolic threat exerted an 
effect on voting intentions indirectly via Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs, which is 
consistent with the view that symbolic threat is more strongly associated with prejudice than 
political intolerance (see Skitka et al., 2013).  
In addition, our results also showed that perceptions of both realistic and symbolic 
threat were indirectly associated with voting intentions via Islamophobic attitudes. 
Interestingly, in our path model, Islamophobia was negatively associated with intention to 
vote leave; however, further inspection of this association suggested that the direct path was 
not significant once the mediatory effects of Islamophobic conspiracist narratives had been 
taken into account. In other words, those who scored more highly in terms of racist attitudes 
toward Muslims were more likely to adopt conspiracist cognitions about Islam and Europe, 
and it was this pathway that was associated with intention to vote to leave the EU. One way 
of viewing this finding is to first acknowledge that racism directed at Muslims is 
longstanding in nations where European Muslims live, with Muslims constructed as a clear 
out-group engendering responses of general concern, anxiety, and fear (Yilmaz, 2016). Of 
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course, such patterns of racism may have been exacerbated in the context of the Brexit vote 
by violent extremism in the name of Islam and increased fear about future acts of terrorism 
on European soil, but what is noteworthy is that racist discourse and attitudes appear to be 
associated with greater conspiracist beliefs about Islam in Europe. In turn, some individuals 
may have been more likely to vote to leave the EU for fear that Europe is being Islamised. 
Influenced by a racist binary that casts Muslims as a distinct out-group that threats the 
existential, material, and physical safety of the in-group (Messina, 2016) was associated with 
false beliefs that Europe is being Islamised; voting to the EU may have been seen as a means 
of protecting the legitimacy of the in-groups privileged position.  
In addition to the influence of Islamophobia, our results also suggested that the link 
between symbolic (but not realistic) threat and the intention to vote to leave the EU was 
mediated by belief in the Islamophobic conspiracy narrative. This aspect of our findings 
corroborates previous work with German respondents (Ünal, 2016), where it was reported 
that perceived symbolic (but not realistic) threat was associated with greater belief in 
Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs. Our work extends previous research by suggesting that 
such conspiracist narratives may have influenced the decision to vote to leave the EU in our 
participants. An additionally important finding in our study was that belief in the 
Islamophobic conspiracist narrative was associated with generic conspiracist beliefs; that is, a 
tendency to think in conspiracist terms appears to have been positively associated with belief 
is a specific, Islamophobic conspiracist narrative. This finding is consistent with the extant 
literature suggesting that belief in conspiracy theories are monological (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; 
Swami et al., 2010, 2011; Wood et al., 2012). One further aspect of our findings vis-à-vis 
conspiracist beliefs is important: we found that intolerance of ambiguity was associated with 
generic conspiracist beliefs. This is noteworthy because at least one previous study has 
reported that tolerance of ambiguity is not significantly associated with endorsement of 
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conspiracy theories (Moulding et al., 2016). A number of possibilities may explain this 
discrepancy, including differences in the manner that both tolerance of ambiguity and 
conspiracist ideation were measured across studies, as well as sampling variations. Future 
work may wish to further investigate this association to ascertain its reliability, although it 
should also be pointed out that the association in the present study, though significant, was 
relatively weak.  
In our study, we also found that identification with the national in-group (in this case, 
the extent to which participants’ identities were shaped by being British) was positively 
associated with greater perceived symbolic and realistic threat. This is consistent with 
previous work in European nations suggesting that greater identification with the national in-
group is associated with greater perceived threat from Muslim immigrants (e.g., González et 
al., 2008; Ünal, 2016). In contrast to our hypotheses, however, we found that the direct link 
between identification with the in-group and intention to vote to leave the EU was not 
significant. It seems likely, therefore, that the effects of in-group identification on voting 
intentions were mediated by other factors, primarily perceived threat. In addition, and 
consistent with previous work (e.g., Sidanius et al., 2016; Ünal, 2016), we also found that 
belief in the clash of civilisation narrative – that is, belief that there is an ongoing clash of 
civilisations between the Western and Islamic worlds – was positively associated with greater 
perceived symbolic and realistic threat. Taken together, these findings suggest that there were 
a number of antecedenal, individual difference factors that shaped perceptions of threat in our 
sample.  
One final point about our findings is worth highlighting: in our study, political 
knowledge of the EU was not significantly associated with any other included variable. 
Including political knowledge as a direct predictor of voting intentions also returned a null 
effect. This is surprising given that one previous study found that greater political 
European Union Referendum 25 
sophistication – which included a measure of political knowledge of the EU – was associated 
with lower support for EU integration (de Vrees and Baumgaarden, 2006). Of course, it is 
possible that it is the broader construct of political sophistication, rather than political 
knowledge specifically, that is associated with attitudes toward EU integration. Another 
possibility is that the lack of a significant association in the present study was an artefact of 
ceiling effects in our measure of political knowledge (see Footnote 1). It is possible that a 
different measure of political knowledge may have resulted in very different findings.  
The main strength of the present study was our ability to examine attitudes toward EU 
integration via a specific, sample-relevant outcome, namely voting intentions during the UK 
EU referendum. However, this might also be viewed as a limitation of the present work: in 
the absence of post-voting follow-up data, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent voting 
intention translated into actual voting behaviour in our sample. One concern is that, while our 
data provided a snapshot of voting intentions at a particular point in time (i.e., in mid-April 
2016), events that occurred in the intervening period before the actual vote may have affected 
voting intentions in ways that are difficult to determine. Our use of an online recruitment 
method also means that we cannot be certain about the generalisability of our findings to the 
wider British population. Indeed, our finding that 55.1% of participants intended to vote to 
remain, whereas only 22.1% intended to vote to leave the EU, points to a discrepancy with 
the final referendum result, which suggests that either some participants changed their minds 
post-study, that our sample is not generalisable, or both.  
Other limitations of the present study include our focus on an identities approach to 
the exclusion of other factors that may have influenced voting intentions, including factors 
derived from a political approach (e.g., attitudes toward incumbent political parties) and a 
utilitarian approach (e.g., financial or job security). This is important because our work 
cannot speak to other issues that may have influence voting intentions in our sample; that is, 
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we cannot draw any conclusions about other, unmeasured motivations of voting intentions 
(e.g., that citizens used the referendum to reject politics as they know it; Koch, 2017). Even 
from the point-of-view of an identities approach, there may have been other neglected 
variables that further mediated or even suppressed our effects. Swami and Furnham (2014) 
have highlighted a range of potentially relevant factors, including personality traits, and 
extreme paranoia and suspiciousness. Finally, it is important to highlight that our data are 
cross-sectional and, while we have interpreted our findings in line with contemporary 
theorising (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Gabel, 1998; Lubbers, 2008), some caution 
should be exercised when interpreting causational effects.  
Despite these limitations, our findings provide a valuable snapshot of voting 
intentions for the UK EU referendum and suggest that the intention to vote to the leave the 
EU may have been partly motivated by Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs and Islamophobia, 
which were in turn shaped perceived threats and a wider set of antecedenal factors. Of course, 
this is not to suggest that identities broadly-defined were the “real cause” of voting intentions 
vis-à-vis the UK EU referendum; rather, it seems likely that there were multiple, 
heterogeneous “causes” that together shaped voting intentions in complex ways (Clarke & 
Newman, 2017). Nevertheless, what is clear from the present findings is that, in our sample at 
least, voting intentions may have been driven by feelings of national attachment and 
perceptions of threat to the nation-state and national integrity from Muslim immigrants. If 
nothing else, our findings provide some much-needed context to commentaries about Brexit 
and emphasise the role of individual cognitions on attitudes toward EU integration.  
Footnotes 
1 It is possible that the null relationships with political knowledge was a function of ceiling 
effects. Mean scores on this measure were very low (see Table 2) and the majority of 
participants (59.1%) failed to answer any of the five questions correctly.  
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2 When participants who were undecided or unsure about their voting intentions (n = 69) 
were excluded from the analyses, the final model still had acceptable fit, χ2(14) = 40.537, p < 
.001; χ²normed = 2.896; CFI = .982; SRMR = .049; RMSEA = .090 with 90% CI = .059-.123. 
However, inspection of maximum likelihood scalar estimates indicated that there was one 
non-significant path from intolerance of ambiguity to general conspiracist beliefs (estimate = 
0.161, SE = .131, CR = 1.232, p = .218). The model without this path had acceptable fit, 
χ2(15) = 42.054, p < .001; χ²normed = 2.804; CFI = .981; SRMR = .061; RMSEA = .088 with 
90% CI = .057-.120. 
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Table 1. Factor Loadings for the Islamophobic Conspiracist Belief Scale 
Item Factor loading 
1. There is an ongoing attempt to Islamise and Arabise Europe, thereby 
weakening Europe’s existing culture and values. 
.94 
2. Europe is on the brink of racial and cultural extinction in the face of a 
coordinated campaign of domination by Muslims to transform Europe 
into an Islamic colony. 
.93 
3. Immigration is being used by Muslims as a means of Islamising 
Europe. 
.93 
4. The Islamisation of Europe is being supported by liberal politicians, 
but concealed from the public through deliberate media disinformation. 
.91 
5. Muslims are intent on Islamising Europe through the introduction of 
Sharia law. 
.91 
6. Islam is a totalitarian ideology, rather than religion, that is intent on 
destroying European culture and identity. 
.90 
7. Liberal elites in Europe, through their weakness and misguided 
liberalism, aid Islamisation. 
.90 
8. The high birth-rate of Muslims in Europe is an intentional attempt to 
Islamise Europe. 
.90 
9. The government of this country is enthusiastically co-operating with 
the Islamisation of Europe. 
.90 
10. Europe’s Christian identity and values are being threatened by the 
Islamisation of its population. 
.90 
11. The European White community are the true victims of racism from 
Muslims. 
.86 
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12. Muslims who do not signal their Muslimness (e.g., by wearing 
religious clothing) are in fact in camouflage (changing their appearance 
to blend in) and this makes them more dangerous. 
.80 
13. A secret project exists between European politicians and the Arab 
world for the Islamisation of Europe. 
.77 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Sex Differences, and Bivariate Correlations between All Variables Included in the Present Study 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs  .45** .79** .45** .86** .78** .75** .43** .06 .55** 
(2) General conspiracist beliefs   .32** .13* .42** .33** .33** .13* .03 .28** 
(3) Clash-of-civilisations attributions    .38** .76** .77** .60** .26* .07 .46** 
(4) Identification with national in-group     .36** .48** .45** .38** .10 .30** 
(5) Islamophobia      .75** .66** .34** .03 .45** 
(6) Realistic threat appraisal       .74** .66** .07 .52** 
(7) Symbolic threat appraisal        .44** .01 .44** 
(8) Intolerance of ambiguity         .02 .15* 
(9) Political knowledge of the EU          .10 
(10) EU membership referendum votea           
Womenb M 2.50 2.27 2.89 3.61 1.96 5.43 4.33 4.40 0.64 - 
 SD 1.59 0.81 1.06 1.08 1.19 1.97 1.88 0.54 1.05 - 
Menb M 2.84 2.35 3.05 3.66 2.31 5.79 4.67 4.40 0.89 - 
 SD 1.67 0.95 1.10 1.05 1.20 1.87 1.95 0.52 1.18 - 
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 t 1.80 0.74 1.20 0.46 2.50 1.58 1.52 0.02 1.96 - 
 p .073 .459 .230 .647 .013 .115 .130 .984 .051 - 
 d 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.29 0.18 0.18 <0.01 0.23 - 
 
Note. aDummy coded so that 1 = Remain/Have not decided/not sure and 2 = Leave the EU; bSex-comparisons were Bonferroni-corrected so that 
p = .005. * p < .05, ** p < .001. N = 303.   
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Table 3. Decomposition of unstandardised and standardised direct and indirect effects on intention to vote leave, with bootstrap standard errors 
in parentheses 
 
p < .001 unless denoted, *p = .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pathway Direct Effect  Indirect Effect 
 Unstandardised Standardised  Unstandardised Standardised 
General conspiracy beliefs → Islamophobic conspiracist belief .772 (.094) .469 (.048)  .071 (.019) .182 (.047) 
Intolerance of ambiguity → Islamophobic conspiracist belief  .685 (.157) .235 (.057)  .096 (.024) .124 (.031) 
Symbolic threat → Islamophobic conspiracist belief .637 (.027) .751 (.027)  .089 (.009) .412 (.040) 
Symbolic threat → Islamophobia .073 (.038) .125 (.069)  .011 (.006) .053 (.029) 
Clash of civilisations → Islamophobia .629 (.118) .642 (.099)  .098 (.022) .260 (.058) 
Identification with national in-group → Realistic threat .886* (.091) .484* (.043)  .099 (.014) .253 (.033) 
Intolerance of ambiguity → Realistic threat 1.438 (.182) .391* (.051)  .160 (.053) .205 (.031) 
Clash of civilisations → Realistic threat 1.088 (.091) .678 (.047)  .121 (.016) .326 (.041) 
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Figure 1. The hypothesised model of intention to vote leave 
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Figure 2. Path diagram model with estimated standardised coefficients 
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Figure 3. Mediation model of Islamophobia, Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs, and intention to vote leave. The path coefficients are included for 
the unstandardised direct effect, with the standardised direct effect inside the parenthesis. The unstandardised indirect effect is in italics, with 
the standardised indirect in parenthesis. p ≤ .001 unless denoted, *p = ns 
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Figure 4. Mediation model of realistic threat, Islamophobia (cognitive), and intention to vote leave. The path coefficients are included for the 
unstandardised direct effect, with the standardised direct effect inside the parenthesis. The unstandardised indirect effect is in italics, with the 
standardised indirect in parenthesis. p ≤ .001 unless denoted, *p = ns 
 
 
 
